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The debate on Canada's dependence on the United States, both in terms of imports and exports, 
was recently revived by the renegotiation of NAFTA that led to CUSMA, the health crisis in COVID-
19 and the associated economic crisis, and the imposition of new tariffs on Canadian aluminum. 
When US President Donald Trump, together perhaps with his advisers, invoked national security 
to justify imposing tariffs on steel and aluminum from Canada and other countries (May 2018 - 
May 2019), and more recently again on Canadian aluminum (August 2020, canceled in 
September) in the wake of a series of tariffs on imports of wines, whiskeys, cheeses and planes 
from the European Union, he affirmed that Canada like Europe and China exploited as always the 
United States and that the latter will be richer, more prosperous and secure if they limit their 
trade with foreign countries by producing at home the products currently imported from Canada, 
Europe and Asia. Several American and foreign observers denounced this reasoning. 
We heard Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and his Deputy Prime Minister in charge of 
Free Trade Christina Alexandra ‘Chrystia’ Freeland affirm the principles and benefits of 
international trade. They claimed that the US President's decision was not only ludicrous, but 
would generate unnecessary and unjustified costs on both sides of the border to the detriment 
of the national security of both countries, their workers and their citizens. But they also added 
that they would defend, as they always have in the past, the interests of Canadian workers in 
the aluminum industry as well as those in other industries. In doing so, they echoed and 
repeated Donald Trump's words almost verbatim, just as government officials in Europe and 
Asia did. 
We are also likely to hear political and economic leaders call for preferential treatment for 
“made locally” over “made abroad,” and to put their words into action by showing themselves 
very generous to certain chosen businesses and industries that they deem meritorious or 
essential. This is essentially a populist pitch—representative of what is commonly referred to as 




Rather than focussing on the true determinants of economic and social success and contributing 
to a better understanding of how the economy works, they prefer to play the role of big 
spender—dispensing other people’s money and banking on the ignorance and self-interested 
credulity of a non-negligible subgroup of the population and its elites. 
Or, from another perspective, some might want to use free trade and its expected benefits as 
leverage to persuade or incentivize potential trading partners to change their economic, social, 
or environmental policies. Thus, we might oppose free trade with potential partners because of 
their policies, or lack of policies, on matters such as working conditions and worker safety, child 
labour, pollution, deforestation, laws protecting physical and intellectual property, laws 
governing competition (antitrust), etc. This use of free-trade agreements, while not wholly 
unreasonable and unjustified, too often conceals the goal of shielding economic, social, labour-
union, cultural, or environmental (green) vested interests.1  
Too often the specificities of the partners are ignored under the cover of lofty posturing. 
Development takes time, and we cannot reasonably expect a poorer partner to immediately 
adopt policies and lifestyle adjustments that wealthier partners defined, adopted, and delivered 
over a period of fifty years or more. An operational free-trade agreement may well be the best 
way to nudge a poorer country along and help it develop harmoniously while allowing the 
developed country to benefit from its comparative advantages.                    
The globalization of markets and the internationalization of cultures are often held responsible 
for destroying jobs in developed countries owing to outsourcing, off-shoring, and imports; for 
                                                                
1 See, for example, the negative reaction of the French government to the draft free trade agreement between the 
European Union and Mercosur (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay) in the wake of the Ambec Report, Dispositions 
et effets potentiels de la partie commerciale de l’Accord d’Association entre l’Union Européenne et le Mercosur en 
matière de développement durable (https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/rapport_complet.pdf) 
https://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2020/09/19/la-france-s-oppose-a-l-accord-entre-l-union-europeenne-et-
le-mercosur_6052835_3234.html. Reacting to comments made by France and Germany, the Brazilian president is 
said to have retorted “These countries criticizing us don’t have a problem with fires because they already burned all 
of their forests.” France’s Fédération nationale des syndicats d’exploitants agricoles (FNSEA, France) (National 
federation of farmers’ unions) expressed its satisfaction with the government’s opposition! A high European official 
also stated that he doubted that the members of Mercosur “… would agree to return to the negotiating table 
without also bringing a new list of demands. If we set out to combat deforestation with a free-trade agreement, 




encouraging the exploitation of workers in developing countries by unscrupulous entrepreneurs 
in the pay of businesses, investors, and consumers in developed countries; and, finally, for 
undermining food security with food imports, environmental security through transportation-
related GHG emissions and, more generally, national security by the forging of global, and 
therefore multi-country, supply chains.  
Free-trade within a portfolio of government policies 
All of these claims are fundamentally false, and they all illustrate ignorance and a total 
misunderstanding of three of the most important elements of modern economic history: the 
trustworthiness of prices and their coordinating and incentivizing nature, opportunity costs, and 
comparative advantage.  
These assertions are rooted in confusion between the impacts of free-trade policies and those 
of other, more or less flawed, economic policies, which can be, and often are, incorrectly 
attributed to the expansion of free trade. Similarly, the impacts of phenomena not explicitly 
accounted for, such as technological change and evolving competitive pressures, are too quickly 
laid at the feet of free trade. In other words, it is easy to blame free trade for “negative” 
outcomes that are not due to trade policy but rather to other policies or phenomena, the 
unfavourable effects of which parallel and often predate it. These parallel effects reduce, 
overshadow, and sometimes reverse the changes brought about by free trade. Sometimes, 
these preexisting harms to the economy can be exacerbated by free trade. The counterfactual, 
or what would have happened in the absence of changes to the conditions or parameters of 
free trade, is often poorly modelled, setting the stage for free trade to be the scapegoat for 
damages that are actually attributable to ill-advised crony capitalism.  
While empirical studies are currently all the rage in economics, we must never forget that an 
empirical study is only as good as its theoretical underpinnings. The theoretical model must be 




explicitly defined.2 We might even coin the term “empiriness” to mirror the “mathiness” 
described by Paul Romer (2015).3 
Confounding the impacts of various phenomena and policies is a common error, frequently 
agenda driven and intentional. This is a sophisticated variant on the post hoc ergo propter hoc 
error, a fallacy or cognitive bias that consists of treating as a cause that which only precedes. 
We encounter this error under various guises in a number of academic contributions, in which a 
change in the conditions of free trade—typically a new agreement or a significant shift in 
international trade with a strong emphasis on imports—is identified as the cause of various 
changes in the economy (transitions in employment and wages, factory closures, changes in 
some tax revenues, societal transformations, child labour and other calamities, etc.).  
Popular misconceptions, beliefs, superstitions, and magical thinking commonly arise from this 
error. A cause-and-effect relationship is inferred without due consideration of the potential 
impact of other aspects of economic policy, which may be poorly designed or implemented, or 
mismatched with the socioeconomic challenges that existed prior to the “opening to free trade” 
event, or even concurrent with it. 
                                                                
2 Sound modelling of causality in a situation with correlations and confounding factors is complicated in any area of 
science. In The book of Why - The New Science of Cause and Effect (Basic Books, 2018), Judea Pearl (and Dana 
Mackenzie) claim that causal analysis, in particular the new revolution in causality studies, makes it possible to go 
from correlation to causality, thus ending a century of confusion and placing the study of cause and effect on solid 
scientific footing. But even today, many statistical studies, AI studies, and econometric studies do not go past 
measuring correlations and lack any credible statements about causality, whatever the claims of their authors.    
3 Paul Romer (2015), “Mathiness in the Theory of Economic Growth,” American Economic Review Papers and 
Proceedings:”Mathiness lets academic politics masquerade as science. Like mathematical theory, mathiness uses a 
mixture of words and symbols, but instead of making tight links, it leaves ample room for slippage between 
statements in the languages of words as opposed to symbols, and between statements with theoretical as opposed 
to empirical content. Because it is difficult to distinguish mathiness from mathematical theory, the market for 
lemons tells us that the market for mathematical theory might collapse, leaving only mathiness as entertainment 
that is worth little but cheap to produce.” We could paraphrase Romer as follows: “Empiriness lets academic 
politics masquerade as science. Like econometric theory, empiriness uses a mixture of words and symbols, but 
instead of making tight links, it leaves ample room for slippage between statements in the languages of words as 
opposed to symbols, and between statements with theoretical as opposed to empirical content. Because it is 
difficult to distinguish empiriness from econometric theory, the market for lemons tells us that the market for 





Associating these undesirable, even disastrous, effects with trade policy is clearly indicative of a 
flawed representation (theoretical model) of reality. Too often, alleged measures of the impact 
of free trade in fact reflect the combined effects of correlated causal factors with insufficient 
attention being paid to the appropriateness of the underlying theory. This results in empirical 
results that, while “statistically significant,” are specious, misleading, and fundamentally of little 
value.4  
The following list of academic publications, impressive but by no means comprehensive, all 
suffer to varying degrees of seriousness from this error: Ricardo Hausmann, Jason Hwang, and 
Dani Rodrik, 2007. “What you export matters,” Journal of Economic Growth, vol. 12(1), 1–25; 
Svetlana Demidova, 2008. “Productivity Improvements and Falling Trade Costs: Boon or Bane?” 
International Economic Review, vol. 49(4), 1437–1462; Erhan Artuç, Shubham Chaudhuri, and 
John McLaren, 2010. “Trade Shocks and Labor Adjustment: A Structural Empirical Approach,” 
American Economic Review, vol. 100(3), 1008–1045; David H. Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. 
Hanson, 2013. “The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the 
United States,” American Economic Review, vol. 103(6), 2121–2168; Avraham Ebenstein, Ann 
Harrison, Margaret McMillan, and Shannon Phillips, 2014. “Estimating the Impact of Trade and 
Offshoring on American Workers using the Current Population Surveys,” The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, vol. 96(4), 581–595; Rafael Dix‐Carneiro, 2014. “Trade Liberalization 
and Labor Market Dynamics,” Econometrica, vol. 82(3), 825–885.  
In virtually all of these cases, any difficulties or negative effects associated with free trade in a 
given country can be attributed to some comparative anomaly on unexplained situation in that 
country. Therefore, these analyses should not be used to detract from free trade, but rather to 
learn about and identify economic policy recommendations to eliminate, reform, or redefine 
the existing policies responsible for the undesirable situation.  
                                                                
4 To summarize, in order to produce all potential benefits, a free-trade policy may often require changes to some 





In an attempt to understand countries’ decisions regarding what to specialize in producing and 
exporting, Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2007) develop a “local cost discovery” process that 
provides a partial explanation. This is complementary to the traditional model that relies on 
basic inputs, such as endowments in physical and human capital, labour, natural resources, and 
high-quality socioeconomic institutions, which are the core determinants of relative prices 
(comparative advantage). This idiosyncratic and highly uncertain cost discovery process requires 
significant efforts from entrepreneurs and yields results that are partly public. Owing to 
imitation and competition, the costs of these efforts can only be partially recovered, creating a 
more or less serious market failure and suboptimal investment levels. Traditional policies, such 
as easing the terms of credit, improving institutions (battling corruption, affirming property 
rights, and enforcing contracts) and reducing barriers to entry do not correct this market failure. 
The authors see a positive and important role for government in configuring the structure of 
production, naturally assuming that the interventions will be properly targeted on the market 
failure in question. However, this raises the following question: How can the government obtain 
knowledge that is unavailable to entrepreneurs in the sector? One of the key characteristics of 
free trade is that it provides an incentive for entrepreneurs to provide the appropriate efforts. 
Demidova (2008) suggests that countries have a differentiated but unexplained access to the 
portfolio of technologies. This is a key determinant of her results that a country may suffer from 
opening to international trade. She concludes that countries have an interest in investing in 
their infrastructures in order to better profit from international productivity gains and trade-
related reductions in transactions costs. However, increased access to available technologies 
and improvements to infrastructure are precisely what makes opening its borders to free trade 
desirable for a given country. 
Artuç, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2010) raise the following questions: What are the costs borne 
by workers who want to transfer to a new industry in response to competition created by 
imports? How long will it take for the labour market to adjust and find its new steady state? Will 
the impact of this new steady state on workers in the sector affected by imports persist? What 




and the dynamics of transition are accounted for? Clearly, these are vital questions. The authors 
propose a model for the costs workers incur in moving between sectors that includes option 
values to account for the long-term effects (benefits) created by free trade. Their results reveal 
that it may take several years for the economy to adjust to a free trade shock and that the 
impact on wages in the most affected sectors can be significant. Nonetheless, the most affected 
workers can benefit from free trade because of increases in real wages in other sectors and the 
option value generated by labour-market mobility and trade liberalization. According to the 
authors, gross movements in the labour market exceed net movements by an order of 
magnitude. To see this, consider this data from BLS-BED:5          
Period Gross jobs created 
/ quarter 
Gross jobs lost / 
quarter 
Net jobs / quarter. 
1992.III – 2007.IV 7.904 M 7.497 M 407 K 
2008.I – 2010.I 6.619 M 7.654 M -1040 K 
2010.II – 2011.IV 6.869 M 6.355 M 514 K 
2010.II – 2013.IV 6.981 M 6.394 M 586 K 
2014.I – 2019.IV 7.480 M 6.957 M 523 K 
 
Thus, each net job created in the period preceding the recession of 2008.I to 2010.I (62 
quarters) represented an average of 19.4 jobs created and 18.4 jobs lost in private sector 
establishments, while each net job created in the intervening expansion from 2010.II to 2013.IV 
(15 quarters) was the result of an average of 11.9 jobs created and 10.9 jobs lost. During the 
period from 2014.I to 2019.IV (24 quarters), each net job created was the result of 14.3 jobs 
created and 13.3 jobs lost. The process of job gains and losses is complex and involves large 
employment movements throughout the economy. This is creative destruction at work. 
                                                                




Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013)6 provide an example of neglecting to account for dynamic 
changes in labour-market adjustments. Analyzing the impact on U.S. labour markets of 
increasing competition from Chinese imports between 1990 and 2007, they conclude that 
growing exposure to Chinese imports increases unemployment, reduces labour-force 
participation, and lowers wages in local labour markets. They suggest that the negative fallout 
of free trade may be greater today than in the past and allude to immigration effects. 
Unfortunately, their study is essentially static and limited to local labour markets (commuting 
zones). They do not attempt to provide a more global characterization of the effects of free 
trade, for example on interregional migration or on welfare itself. Their work confirms 
expectations in terms of the adjustments caused or exacerbated by free trade, in light of 
preexisting or concurrent government policies that hamper spontaneous adjustments, while 
failing to provide an overview of the benefits and costs of these adjustments in the medium and 
long term. Consequently, it is of limited interest. 
Ebenstein, Harrison, McMillan, and Phillips (2014) link industrial data on trade and offshoring 
with personal data from Current Population Surveys from 1984 to 2002. Their results suggest 
that globalization has substantially undermined wages at the level of professions (panels of 
workers) but not industries. They deserve credit for emphasizing the limits of this type of study. 
Thus, they observe that a major limitation of their study is the impossibility of completely 
isolating the impact of trade and offshoring from the impacts of other changes in the labour 
market. They speak of two principal identification challenges. First, changes to the labour 
market (competitive pressures, union activities, excessive and costly regulations, etc.) may be 
the reason for international trade and offshoring. This reversal of causality would invalidate the 
usual causal interpretation of the results. Next, technological change may be correlated with 
international trade. Again, this would invalidate the causal interpretation of the estimated 
coefficients. For example, if the most routine tasks are those most easily performed abroad or 
automated, it would be difficult to exactly model the counterfactual of the evolution of wages in 
the absence of globalization, as workers would simultaneously face competitive pressures from 
                                                                
6 Also see David H. Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson & Jae Song, 2014. “Trade Adjustment: Worker-Level 




workers in low-wage countries and from automation. This is a recurring problem with 
econometric studies based on a poorly articulated theoretical model. 
Dix-Carneiro (2014) proposes a study resembling that of Artuç, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2010) 
for the case of Brazil. Its specification of adjustment dynamics is better, as is its modelling of 
counterfactual wages—though this latter is not totally satisfactory in light of the warnings 
issued by Ebenstein, Harrison, McMillan, and Phillips (2014). Dix-Carneiro’s results basically 
establish that labour market transitions are complex and costly, and may only be fully realized 
several years after implementation of a new trade liberalization program. Adjustment costs may 
offset between 11 and 26 per cent of the value of free trade, depending on the degree of inter-
sectorial mobility of physical capital. However, while calling for more research, Dix-Carneiro 
remains silent on the portfolio of policies that would have better prepared Brazil, in particular in 
terms of labour and capital mobility and productivity gains, relaxing the barriers to free trade, 
and better management of the subsequent labour-market adjustments.  
The next two studies address the environment, in particular the frequently articulated claim 
that the globalization of markets and the internationalization of cultures undermine 
environmental security owing to GHG emissions generated by transportation: Rikard Forslid, 
2020. “Trade, Transportation and the Environment,” Research Papers in Economics 2020:2, 
Stockholm University, Department of Economics; Aaditya Mattoo & Arvind Subramanian, 2013. 
“Four Changes to Trade Rules to Facilitate Climate Change Action”, VoxEU, Center for Economic 
Policy Research (CEPR), Peterson Institute for International Economics, PB13–10.  
Forslid (2020) tells us that transportation was responsible for approximately 29 per cent of total 
GHG emissions in the United States in 2017, and approximately 41 per cent in California. 
Reducing GHG emissions in the transportation sector is thus identified as very important for 
reducing them globally. International trade leads to expanded transportation and the 
development of global production networks within which production is geographically 
fragmented, magnifying the need for transportation. Transportation is responsible for 33 
per cent of emissions associated with global trade, and the maritime transportation of goods 




those of Italy’s fleet of 38 million privately-owned vehicles. This gives rise to calls for consuming 
local goods and reducing international trade. In general, Forslid’s results are that transportation 
can, in fact, cut emissions when general equilibrium effects are considered, depending on the 
relative emissions rates of transportation and production in the various exporting and importing 
regions. Even if exporters and importers are comparable in terms of emissions, interregional 
trade and transportation can result in globally lower emissions than transportation-free local 
production if that sector is more polluting than transportation. Assuming full -employment of 
resources at equilibrium, less trade implies a shift of resources from transportation services to 
the production of goods, which will increase emissions if producing the goods in question 
generates more pollution than transportation. In reality, the linkage between international 
trade, transportation, and CO2 emissions fundamentally depends on the structure of pollution 
prices.  
We might add that, if environmental protection is properly ensured, for example by means of a 
competitive price on carbon, both the siting of production and transportation can be expected 
to gravitate toward their respective social optima.   
Mattoo and Subramanian (2013) recognize that the objectives of trading and fighting climate 
change are often perceived as irreconcilable. Moreover, at this time, implementing a strategy to 
combat climate change is proving to be “fiendishly” elusive, as evinced by the failures of the 
Conferences of the Parties (COP) in Paris (2015), Marrakesh (2016), Bonn (2017), Katowice 
(2018), and Madrid (2019).  
The authors present four free trade policies that could, in the absence of a global agreement on 
implementing the resolutions of these COP, contribute to a rapprochement between the 
proponents of freer trade and those who prioritize dealing with climate change. Mattoo and 
Subramanian begin by emphasizing that only dramatic technological innovation can reconcile 
the goals of climate change action and satisfying humanity’s energy aspirations. This 
technological progress requires deployment of a comprehensive array of policy instruments to 
establish a competitive carbon price and provide incentives for research and development in 




They suggest four examples of changes to the WTO trade rules that would make it easier to 
account for climate change objectives. They all have an economic policy rationale. First, 
penalizing imports of products that are harmful to the environment by allowing them to be 
taxed at the border; next, promoting products and technologies that are environmentally 
friendly by relaxing restrictions on production and export subsidies and by enforcing the 
protection of intellectual property rights on green technologies; and, finally, prohibiting 
penalties on products that are relatively good for the environment—for example, restrictions on 
the export of natural gas, which is considered a clean alternative to coal and oil.  
In light of the dynamics of the negotiations underway between China (and other countries, such 
as India) on one side and the United States and the European Union on the other, these 
proposals represent an attractive compromise. China would be prevailed on to clarify existing 
rules to allow the United States to implement bilateral trade agreements and to strengthen 
intellectual property protections, and the United States and European Union to agree to rule 
changes allowing China to subsidize green technologies and products. A balance of concessions 
between the main trading blocs, rich and poor, would facilitate a technological revolution 
thanks to increased international cooperation on climate change while also fostering the 
harmonious expansion of free trade.  
The goals of food security or sovereignty  
In developed countries particularly, the goal of food security or sovereignty translates into 
various supply management programmes and / or generous farm subsidies to the detriment of 
consumers and taxpayers. To bolster their arguments, ostensibly aimed at promoting collective 
wellbeing, proponents of food sovereignty argue that it kills two birds with one stone by also 




The economists Marcel Boyer and Sylvain Charlebois estimate that, in 2007, supply 
management cost Quebeckers $575 million per year, or $300 per family of four.7 The argument 
for food sovereignty has a certain appeal, but it is nonetheless fallacious and dangerous.  
If individuals wish to buy local, that’s fine. It’s their right. It’s a matter of taste. And there’s 
nothing wrong with producers, whether collectively or individually, promoting their products by 
playing up their home-grown character. It’s a matter of marketing and competition. But it gets 
dicey when it becomes economic policy. This is especially true in that the reactions of trading 
partners could be very the reactions of trade partners could be very unfavorable to supporters 
of food sovereignty: international trade (exports plus imports) represents some 60% of global 
GDP today8.   
Proponents of buying local trumpet their desire to support the local economy and claim they 
are willing to pay more for some locally produced goods, even if similar products are available 
cheaper. Would it not rather make more sense for them to choose the cheaper alternatives and 
allocate their savings to purchasing other local goods, such as cultural products, for example, or 
even to supporting local charities? These unrealized expenditures represent the opportunity 
costs of buying local at a higher price than necessary.  
Every economic production activity or consumption decision carries an opportunity cost that 
must be properly evaluated: The opportunity cost of buying “local” must always be compared 
with the value of an alternative purchase, including the social and economic value of the 
alternative and the potential savings. 
                                                                
7 Marcel Boyer and Sylvain Charlebois,”La gestion de l’offre des produits agricoles : un système coûteux pour les 
consommateurs,” Note Économique, Institut économique de Montréal, August 2007. 
https://www.iedm.org/sites/default/files/pub_files/agri0807_fr.pdf.  
8 World Bank and OECD: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS. For Québec, a specific but not 
atypical case, remember that nearly 40% of jobs depend on external markets and nearly 50% of its GDP is exported 
(https://www.economie.gouv.qc.ca/fileadmin/contenu/documents_soutien/strategies/strategie_exportation/oser
_exporter_strategie.pdf; Marcel Boyer, “La performance et le développement économiques à long terme du 
Québec: les douze travaux d’Hercule-Québec (mis à jour, revus et corrigés – 7e édition)”, CIRANO 2019s-02, 143 




The goal of environmental security  
This type of fallacy also besets the goal of environmental security. We have known the solution 
to environmental destruction for a long time: Define and impose an appropriate competitive 
price on pollution and eliminate all regulations and other micro policies or control measures 
(pet projects) that pop up left and right and are systematically designed to impose the bulk of 
their cost on others.9  
We often hear that our lifestyle depends on perpetual growth while the planet’s resources are 
limited. This is false. This belief has popped up repeatedly throughout history, only to be 
repudiated each time. In 1865 the economist William Stanley Jevons, one of the best thinkers of 
his time, expressed his concern about the disappearance of forests—and later about the 
depletion of England’s coal reserves.10 This was also the discredited position taken by the Club 
of Rome during the 1970s.11 Innovation, markets, and competitive prices have successfully dealt 
with all the threats of natural resource depletion confronting humanity in the past. Growth is 
driven by humanity’s capacity for invention and innovation, scientific and technological 
progress, and improvements to old and new products and services—our scope for action is 
immense and continues to expand. 
We saw above, in our discussion of the Mattoo and Subramanian paper, how free-trade policies 
and climate change policies can be not only reconciled, but mutually reinforcing. There is still a 
need for rigorous analyses to identify barriers erected by cronyism and private vested interests 
so we can deliver sound policies free of excess costs attributable to “pet projects.” 
      
                                                                
9 See the interesting interview with Christian Gollier (TSE) on Rendez-vous des entrepreneurs français (REF) in 2019. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZS9Xx7hhw3   
10 William Stanley Jevons (1865) The Coal Question: An Inquiry Concerning the Progress of the Nation, and the 
Probable Exhaustion of Our Coal Mines, Macmillan, London. 
11 Donella Meadows, Dennis Meadows, Jørgen Randers, William W. Behrens III (Massachusetts Institute of 




The dynamics of free trade: comparative advantage and equilibrium of choices (Nash) 
In every defence of a specific industry, whether well-intentioned or not, we always find a 
fundamental imbalance between the clearly identified and narrowly targeted interests of some, 
who are able to hire lobbyists to fight for their case, and a greater but more diffuse interest 
spread across the entire economy and the population—who are at the receiving end of a public 
bad and where no-one has enough at stake to contest it. Ultimately, we observe the victory of 
crony capitalism over people’s capitalism, of populism over competence.      
The aluminum industry in Québec has in the past been the subject of multiple and generous 
government subsidies that continue to this day. Several economists have denounced these 
subsidies, sometimes in disguise. Economists Gérard Bélanger and Jean-Thomas Bernard 
estimated12 in 2007 that direct and indirect subsidies to the ALCAN aluminum smelter project in 
Saguenay ("an interest-free loan of $ 400 million over 30 years; tax benefits worth $ 112 million; 
a new 225 MW block supplied by Hydro-Québec at the "large power rate L" from 2010 to 2045; 
the extension of the sale contract for 342 MW delivered by Hydro-Québec at the large power 
rate L from 2024 to 2045; the extension of Alcan's rights to the waters of the Péribonka River 
from 2034 to 2058 for a continuous production of 900 MW”) represented in present value some 
$2.7 billion while the planned investment of ALCAN was of $2.0 billion. These grants 
represented, according to the authors, between $275,000 and $370,000 per job per year for 35 
years. In return, the Québec government "will be able to receive royalties on the adoption of 
AP50 technology by aluminum plants elsewhere in the world". 
The economists Jean-Thomas Bernard, Marcel Boyer, Mr. Martin Boyer and Pierre Fortin 
agreed13, in their defense of a Québec energy policy resolutely focused on the creation of 
                                                                
12 See Gérard Bélanger and Jean-Thomas Bernard, « Susidies for Aluminum Producers : Benefits that don’t add up »,  
Economic Note, Montréal Economic Instuitute, April 2007. 
https://www.iedm.org/sites/default/files/pub_files/avril07_en.pdf  
13 See Jean-Thomas Bernard, Marcel Boyer, Martin Boyer, Pierre Fortin, « Cessons le bradage ! Le développement 






wealth, rather than on the sale of Québec energy at a discount to unprofitable sectors and 
businesses, thus selling off and squandering the potential social wealth of Quebecers. 
After having courageously fought during the negotiations of the Free Trade Agreement (CUSMA) 
the will of Donald Trump to encourage American companies to "buy American", it is not the 
time to promote a local version "Québec first" or "Canada first". Individuals may want to do it, it 
is their choice. But the governments of Québec and Canada must not make it an article of 
economic policy. The US government is behaving irresponsibly internationally, this is no reason 
to follow suit. 
There is a difference between promoting a free-trade policy while providing individuals and 
firms with incentives and means to prepare for and benefit from this policy by taking steps to 
adapt to the expected changes and upheavals within a reasonable time-frame, on one hand, 
and protecting firms and jobs that need to adapt and adjust with a policy of comprehensive and 
ongoing protections, using trade barriers and generous and costly direct and indirect subsidies, 
whether open or hidden, on the other.   
A serious effort must be made to consolidate domestic markets—as they are often splintered by 
intranational barriers to the mobility of goods, services, and labour—and to open up as much as 
possible to the vast international market and profit from opportunities created by free-trade 
agreements. To do this, it needs to be said over and over again that international trade at 
competitive prices, just like intranational and interregional trade, can and must be developed 
for the good of all. And at the same time, it is necessary to promote intra- and international 
trade that is more competitive, more secure, more resilient, and more shielded against 
unilateral protectionist actions of governments.    
It is not the interests of firms and workers in a specific industry that should be defended, but 
rather the principles and mechanisms of healthy competition that must underlie international 
trade—again, just as in the case of intranational and interregional trade. Targeted and 
protectionist defences of the interests of businesses and workers in a particular industry is 




Stand on a street corner and ask 100 passers-by to explain the difference between nuclear 
fusion and nuclear fission. You’ll be lucky if two passers-by understand the question. You might 
be right to conclude that 98% of the passers-by know nothing about nuclear energy. The case of 
international trade is similar. Ask 100 passers-by to explain the link between trade deficit, 
foreign investment, and the exchange rate. If even one can, then run, don’t walk, to buy a 
lottery ticket—this is your lucky day.  
To understand the link, you must first understand comparative (or relative) advantage, the role 
of the exchange rate, and the concepts of trade deficit or surplus and foreign (or cross-border) 
investment deficit or surplus.  
Comparative advantage 
It is too often forgotten that international trade is simply a logical extension of interregional 
trade and interpersonal exchanges. We all have an interest in specializing in the production of 
goods for which we have a comparative advantage and in trading with others for the rest. 
For two centuries, the understanding of comparative advantage, as formulated by the English 
economist David Ricardo in 1817,14 has been at the heart of trade liberalization, phenomenal 
wealth creation, exceptional and inclusive economic and social growth, striking improvements 
in human welfare, and sweeping poverty eradication. It is the most compelling and powerful 
argument against the private interests of anti-trade groups at the regional, inter-regional, and 
international levels, no matter how eloquent their arguments. 
Let us briefly present this key element of modern economic thought: the theory of comparative 
advantage. Suppose that in the current state of their economies, two countries A and B face the 
following choices.  
Country A could increase its food production by 1 unit (however measured) by allocating more 
resources (labour, raw materials, capital) to it. These resources are removed, in the most 
efficient manner possible, from the production of cars, thereby reducing its production of cars 
                                                                




by 2 units. In the jargon of economists, country A can transform food into vehicles and vice 
versa: +1 unit of food into –2 units of cars (or, equivalently, –1 unit of food into +2 units of cars).  
As to Country B, it could increase food production by two units by shifting resources (labour, 
raw materials, capital) to it. These resources are removed, in the most efficient manner 
possible, from the production of cars—reducing that output by three units. Country B’s food-
vehicle transformation rate would then be +2 food units versus –3 vehicle units (or, 
equivalently, –2 food units versus +3 vehicle units).  
Because these two countries have different transformation rates between food and cars in the 
current state of their economies, it is possible to increase the welfare of both countries by 
reallocating production between them. First, assume that country A reduces its food production 
by 1 unit, thus increasing its car production by 2 units and, second, that country B reduces its 
car production by 1.5 units, thus increasing its food production by 1 unit.  
Owing to the transformation rates observed in the two countries, not only is this reallocation 
possible, but it also results in food production remaining constant (–1 + 1 = 0) while the 
production of cars increases (+2 – 1.5 = +0.5). Sharing this increase in output allows both 
countries to augment their wellbeing. This very simple example shows that, to the extent that 
(marginal) transformation rates differ from one country to the next, it is possible to increase the 
welfare of both countries by reallocating production.  
But how can this type of reallocation, resulting in an increase in wellbeing in both countries, be 
effected? The answer is simple: through international trade with exchanges occurring at 
competitive prices. This argument, which is a fundamental result of modern economic analysis, 
is valid at all levels of competitiveness (or absolute advantage) in both countries. Again, even if 
one country were more efficient than the other in producing both goods, both countries would 
benefit from opening their domestic markets to international trade and allowing their 
respective economies to adjust to international prices. The implications of this theory are 




matter, but rather its comparative (or relative) advantages. It is important to emphasize that all 
countries benefit from this trade, regardless of their absolute levels of competitiveness. 
These same countries will also benefit from opening their domestic markets to trade and 
allowing their respective economies to adjust to internationally competitive prices.  
The argument that a trade deficit in one product, or basket of products, will generate net 
payments that leave the country to primarily benefit foreigners reflects a serious 
misunderstanding of how international trade works. It is a flawed argument.  
Some people generally fear the application of competitive processes to the production and 
distribution of public and social, as well as private, goods and services, not only at the domestic, 
but also at the international, level.  
However, the significant growth in international trade in recent decades has been a major factor 
in improving both collective economic wellbeing and cultural and social development. As 
mentioned by Amartya Sen (“If It’s Fair, It’s Good: 10 Truths About Globalization,” International 
Herald Tribune, July 14, 2001): “Pervasive poverty and lives that were ‘nasty, brutish and short,’ 
as Thomas Hobbes put it, dominated the world not many centuries ago, with only a few pockets 
of rare affluence. In overcoming that penury, modern technology as well as economic 
interrelations have been influential. The predicament of the poor across the world cannot be 
reversed by withholding from them the great advantages of contemporary technology, the well-
established efficiency of international trade and exchange, and the social as well as economic 
merits of living in open, rather than closed, societies. What is needed is a fairer distribution of 
the fruits of globalization.” 
The same reasoning applies to intranational trade between regions. Consider two large 
economic sectors, such as food processing and manufacturing, and two large independent 
regions, such as Gaspésie (the Gaspé Peninsula) and Montreal. We could say with no great fear 
of contradiction that Montreal can produce all the goods and services (or nearly) from both 
sectors more efficiently that Gaspésie. Assume now that Gaspésie has a comparative advantage 




from Montreal, should Gaspésie promote “buy local,” erect barriers to trade, and subsidize its 
own manufacturing companies? Clearly not.     
In response to the mathematician Stanislaw Ulam, who challenged him to “name a proposition, 
from the social sciences, that would be both true and non-trivial,” Paul A. Samuelson, winner of 
the 1970 Nobel Prize in economics, countered with comparative advantage: “That [comparative 
advantage] is logically true does not need to be demonstrated to a mathematician; that it is not 
trivial is attested to by the thousands of important and intelligent men who have never been 
able to understand the doctrine for themselves or to believe it after it has been explained to 
them.”15 
(Nash) equilibrium of choices 
It is not easy to detect the comparative advantages of countries, regions, or individuals a priori. 
Furthermore, these advantages may change over time as countries and regions develop and 
individuals acquire new skills. In more technical terms, comparative advantages are expressed 
using national or regional production possibility curves that represent the potential for 
reallocating resources between the production of different products and services and that 
depend on the characteristics of a country’s available natural, institutional, and human 
resources at a given point in time. Clearly, these resources evolve over time: Human resources 
can migrate from one region to another, institutional resources can be imitated, and 
endowments in natural resources can change as a function of past and present prospecting 
efforts.  
All things considered, comparative advantages depend on dynamic and adaptive prospecting 
efforts (investment), institutional developments (rule of law, property rights, contract law, 
human rights, social and physical infrastructure16) and the acquisition and transferability of skills 
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(education). Who (country, region, individual) decides to do what, given what others are doing 
(countries, regions, individuals)? This question has a complex answer. We can well imagine that 
these decisions could yield a Nash equilibrium in which each country, region, or individual 
optimizes its development, given its perception of its partners’ and competitors’ development 
and of the resources available to it.  
One thing is certain: Rationality in a country’s, region’s, or individual’s decision making requires 
a comparative evaluation of how to allocate scarce resources to the many potential 
consumption, training, and investment options available to it on the basis of their actual and 
potential comparative advantage. These actual and potential comparative advantages 
ultimately determine the comparative advantages of tomorrow. China’s comparative 
advantages today are not the same as they were in 1950 (Mao Zedong) or 1980 (Deng Xiaoping). 
This is true for all countries and all regions. Economic plates shift slowly but surely, responding 
to physical forces and individual and social decisions—accompanied by inevitable jolts, tremors, 
and clashes.  
Analysis of these shifts in economic plates, which are partly exogenous and partly endogenous, 
can and must also account for concerted policy interventions from governments at the group 
level (countries and regions). However, international, interregional or intranational, and inter-
individual free trade is consistently a positive element of this analysis. We would not want to be 
obligated to cut ties with others in order to acquire one or several specific skills given the 
constraints we are under. Quite the opposite: this kind of isolation would simply impose more 
constraints. By the same token, we would not want to have to cut ourselves off regionally or 
nationally in order to develop our comparative advantage given the constraints we are under. 
Again, quite the opposite is true.  
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The dynamic development of a country’s or region’s comparative advantage, as in the case of 
individuals, can and should be grounded in an explicit and unreserved participation in the world 
of free trade. Ultimately, this type of development, which is simultaneously modern and 
ambitious, is attainable at the national, regional, and individual level, and trans-nationally as 
well (international free trade), provided we have the intelligence and courage of our ambitions, 
an understanding of the objectives and their interconnectedness allowing us to choose 
programs, policies, modalities, and mechanisms—to wit, the means to achieve our ambitions 
and accomplish our developmental ideals, whether collective or individual, and the courage to 
implement these means. 
Trade deficit, foreign investment, and the exchange rate 
Examining any country’s international trade data always reveals that there are some sectors or 
goods and services with a negative trade balance and others with a positive balance. No country 
has a positive trade balance for all goods and services, and no country should strive for that. In 
addition, the sectorial goods and services trade balance (positive or negative) must be 
considered jointly with the overall trade balance and the balance of financial transactions 
(loans) and foreign direct investment—the balance of direct investment abroad (by nationals) 
and direct investment at home (by foreigners). Their sum constitutes the balance of payments, 
for which “equilibrium pressures” both determine and are determined by the exchange rate. In 
other words, the trade balance for a product or basket of products cannot be considered in 
isolation. 
The argument that a trade deficit in one product, or basket of products, will generate net 
payments that leave the country to primarily benefit foreigners reflects a serious 
misunderstanding of how international trade works. It is a flawed argument. Here’s why. 
Consider a trade deficit (imports higher than exports of goods and services, including tourism), 
on the one hand, and a foreign investment surplus (total inbound investment from abroad 
higher than total outbound investment), on the other. These two taken together form the heads 




exchange rate is the amount of $US, for example, that you can buy with one $C; it is also 
expressed as the amount of $C that an American can buy with one $US. Obviously, each rate is 
the reciprocal of the other: $US / $C = 1 / ($C / $US). 
The trade deficit and investment surplus are, in fact, two sides of the same coin glued together 
by the exchange rate: These three elements are intimately interrelated and cannot be analyzed 
independently. In other words, any one of them cannot be explained in isolation without 
reference to the other two. The trade balance, foreign investment equilibrium, and exchange 
rate are continuously and systematically in equilibrium and their respective values are 
determined jointly. Here is how. 
Let us assume for simplicity that there are only two countries, the United States and Canada. 
When Canadians visit the United States, they must “buy” U.S. dollars and “sell” Canadian 
dollars. Similarly, the importer of U.S. goods and services (exported from the United States) 
must buy U.S. dollars by selling Canadian dollars. When Canadians invest in the United States 
(buying a condo, factory, treasury bills, or stock), they must buy U.S. dollars by selling Canadian 
dollars.  
When Americans come to visit Canada, they must buy Canadian dollars by selling U.S. dollars. 
Similarly, when Americans want to import Canadian goods and services (aluminium or works of 
art exported from Canada) or invest in Canada, they must buy Canadian dollars, paying with 
(selling) their U.S. dollars.  
Thus, there is a supply and demand for Canadian and U.S. dollars that determines the 
equilibrium exchange rate, which is nothing more than the relative equilibrium price of the 
currencies: If the supply of U.S. dollars increases (Americans want to sell more of their U.S. 
dollars to buy Canadian dollars in order to visit Canada, buy Canadian goods and services, or 
invest in Canada), there is downward pressure on the price of the U.S. dollar and the amount of 
U.S. dollars you can buy with one Canadian dollar increases, while the amount of Canadian 




It’s very similar to the tomato market: Too many tomatoes supplied for sale relative to demand 
drives the price of tomatoes down and vice versa, too few tomatoes supplied for sale relative to 
demand drives the price up.  
One simply has to remember that the supply of US$ (and therefore the demand for C$) comes 
from Americans who want to buy Canadian goods and services (including tourism) or invest in 
Canada, while the demand for US$ (and therefore the supply of C$) comes from Canadians who 
want to buy American goods and services or invest in the United States. 
The observed exchange rate is the result of demand and supply pressures in the currency 
market. The total demand for US$ consists of the expenditures incurred in US$ by Canadians for 
their purchases of U.S. goods and services (G&SCA) and investments in the United States (INVCA). 
The supply of US$ is composed of the expenditures incurred in US$ by Americans for their 
purchases of Canadian goods and services (G&SUS) and their investments in Canada (INVUS), and 
similarly for the demand and supply of C$.  
At the observed, and thus competitive, equilibrium exchange rate (supply = demand), the total 
quantity of US$ demanded by Canadians (G&SCA + INVCA) is necessarily equal to the total 
quantity of US$ supplied by Americans (G&SUS + INVUS). Therefore, (G&SCA + INVCA) = (G&SUS + 
INVUS) which can be rewritten as follows (G&SUS - G&SCA) = (INVCA - INVUS), where all values are 
expressed in US$. The left-hand-side (LHS) term in the last equation is the trade deficit / surplus, 
and the RHS term is the investment surplus / deficit. At the observed, and thus equilibrium, 
exchange rate, the above equalities necessarily hold true. 
The above equations do not require that G&SCA = G&SUS (trade equilibrium) or that INVCA = INVUS 
(foreign investment equilibrium). If, at the observed (and thus equilibrium) exchange rate, the 
United States has a trade deficit with Canada (G&SUS > G&SCA), it necessarily follows that it has a 
foreign investment surplus of the same magnitude (INVCA  > INVUS).  
Thus, the exchange rate, the trade deficit and the foreign investment surplus are all determined 
simultaneously: At the observed exchange rate, the trade deficit (surplus) is necessarily 




≠ (G&SUS + INVUS), there is an imbalance and the exchange rate will adjust to reestablish equality 
between the supply of, and demand for, C$ and US$. 
A foreign investment surplus in the United States (meaning that Canada is investing more in the 
United States than Americans are investing in Canada) contributes to the growth of the U.S. 
economy. This foreign investment surplus, which offsets the trade deficit, creates jobs in the 
United States, increases the productivity of the U.S. economy, and contributes to U.S. economic 
growth. Similarly, a trade surplus offsets a foreign investment deficit. 
Any attempt by the United States to reduce its trade deficit (through the imposition of tariffs, 
for example) can only have some combination of the following potential impacts: a shift in the 
trade deficit from protected industries (by the imposition of tariffs) to unprotected industries 
with no significant reduction in the total trade deficit, a reduction in its foreign investment 
surplus, or an appreciation of the US$/C$ exchange rate.  
On July 20, 2019, the New York Times reported the following (reminder: Larry Kudlow is Donald 
J. Trump’s chief economic adviser):  
Larry Kudlow, the chairman of the White House’s National Economic Council, 
said in an interview that the president strongly believed that his policies 
would increase investment and draw workers into the labor force.  
“The United States is the hottest economy and investment destination in the 
world right now, thanks largely to Mr. Trump’s policies. Money is flowing in 
from everywhere and that’s terrific.”  
Larry Kudlow (and his president) should understand that the foreign investment surplus 
necessarily correlates with the trade deficit and therefore naturally mirrors it. He seems not to 
know this, or at least pretends as much! In fact, the second part of his assertion is completely 




“The United States is the hottest economy and ‘trade’ destination in the 
world right now, thanks largely to Mr. Trump’s policies. We incur a large 
trade deficit with everyone and that’s terrific.” 
Anne O. Kruger (2020)17 demonstrates how the ill-informed drive to reduce the trade deficit 
that has been pursued since the election of Donald Trump has hurt the U.S. economy. She states 
that international trade increased from approximately 20 per cent of global output in the 
immediate post-war to 39 per cent in 1990, and then to 58 per cent in 2018. American 
consumers now pay more for many products from China. Also, the United States had to pay out 
some $28 billion in compensation to U.S. farmers.  
She adds that many U.S. companies have had to pay more for their inputs, and have 
consequently lost market share to foreign competitors who benefited from a cost advantage. By 
pulling the United States out of the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) the President 
succeeded in raising tariffs on U.S. exports almost everywhere. Under the TPP, U.S. wheat 
producers would have been spared the 38 per cent tariff that Japan imposes on all wheat 
imports. Now that the TPP has been replaced by the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement 
for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP - a free trade agreement between 11 countries: Canada, 
Australia, Brunei, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam), 
Canadians and Australians exporting wheat to Japan are subject to lower tariffs than their U.S. 
counterparts.  
According to Krueger, high customs duties on U.S. imports of steel and aluminium (that initially 
included those of its trading partners in CUSMA) have only hurt American industries that use 
aluminium and steel and employment in those industries has declined in the past two years.18 
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But why and how do countries benefit from international trade? It is for the same reason that 
regions benefit from interregional trade (Québec-Ontario, Pennsylvania-Ohio) and individuals 
benefit from exchanges amongst themselves. The answer lies in the specialization of labour and 
production that trade allows—a key contributor to productivity. This specialization reflects the 
comparative (or relative) advantages of each and increases the wellbeing of all, regardless of 
their absolute advantages or disadvantages.   
Dynamic or intertemporal analysis applied to a multilateral world (with each country having its 
own monetary policy), certainly renders the analysis more complex, but the basic principles are 
the same. Three complementary factors have allowed international trade to expand to the 
benefit of all: a decline in transportation and travel costs, greater efficiency of financial markets, 
and the development of the important social capital of trust between trading partners through 
open and transparent treaties and the rule of law. These three factors work together to reduce 
transaction costs for the good of all.  
These are the same reasons that led Anne Krueger to assert that the Trump administration 
would have had greater success if it has addressed trade irritants through the agency of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and created multilateral trade alliances rather than 
independently pursuing narrow and fragmented goals. Trump’s bilateralism and rejection of the 
WTO undermines the entire international trading system and imposes great harm on U.S. 
businesses and households, offering illusory or temporary benefits to a handful of groups 
deemed “meritorious, essential, or strategic.” 
It should be reemphasized, however, that a more efficient, productive, or competitive economy 
will be able to export and import more and invest more abroad and receive more foreign direct 
investment, irrespective of the trade and foreign investment deficit or surplus and exchange 
rate fluctuations, and thus benefit from a higher welfare level.  
Rising productivity owing to a workforce that is more skilled, better trained, and highly 




undergone more rigorous scrutiny, selection, and implementation processes; and public and 
private institutions that are more effective and efficient, are all important contributors to a 
country’s or region’s welfare gains, especially against the backdrop of an economy that is more 
open to international trade.   
We can only regret the electoral populism, not to say the ignorance and incompetence, on 
display by too many political leaders, including the president of the United States. 
Unfortunately, he is not alone. 
The current crisis requires a more informed, stronger, and resilient spirit of international 
cooperation able to stand up to anti-globalization trends. Focussing on local or domestic food 
and healthcare clusters, for example, would negatively impact developing countries, among 
others, and thus increase the risk of pandemics in developed countries. More than ever, we 
humans are all in the same boat—but it’s a big boat, which some just cannot seem to grasp.  
Let us hope that the march toward more cooperation, more globalization, more international 
treaties, and more competition, i.e. the march toward a more integrated, inclusive, and civilized 
world, will survive the current COVID-19 crisis and the associated recession and the 
protectionist, erratic, and ill-advised policies of the current U.S. government and several others. 
